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In the 
SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
IK THE MATTER OF THE APPLICA-
TION OF JEROLD E. THOl\fPSON, 
to change the Point of diverson and 
place of use of 4.0 c.f.s. acquired by 
Application No. 16833; Change A pplica-
cation X o. a-2017. 
JOHN C. JicG~\_RRT, 
• Plaintiff and RAespovndent, 
vs. 
JER-OLD E. THO·MPSON and ED. H. 
'\TATSON, STATE ENGINEER .OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendants and .Ap·pellants. 
Brief of Appellants 
·STATEMENT OF CASE 
Cas·e No. 
2528 
This proceeding originated in the office of the State 
Engineer of Utah. The appellant, Jerold E. Thompson, 
filed in that office an application to change the point of 
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2 
diversion and ·place of use of underground water applied 
for in application No. 16833, which application was made 
by one Martin C. Hintzen to ap:propriate four cubic feet 
per second from a well to be drilled on the Southeast 
Quarter of Section 8, Township 35 South, of Range 16 
West, Salt Lake Meridian in Iron County, Utah. 
The application to change the place of use was made 
by the appellant Jerold E. Thompson, as assignee of 
Martin C. Hintzen. Such appJication is designated as 
change application No. a-2017. 
The respondent John C. McGarry filed an objection 
to the application of appellant Jerold E. Thompson upon 
the grounds that he, John C. McGarry, was the owner 
and holder of application No. 16833, as the assignee of 
~"fartin C. Hintzen. 
The state engineer granted the application of Jerold 
E. Thompson and made its order permitting him to 
change the place of use to another tract of land which 
the wife of Jerold E. Thompson was purchasing from 
the state of Utah. 
The respondent John C. McGarry prosecuted an 
appeal from the order of the State Engineer to the Dis-
trict Court of the Fifth Judicial District in and for Iron 
County, Utah. Upon pleadings filed in such District 
Court a trial was had and the District Court reversed the 
order of the State Engineer and held that John C. Mc-
Garry was the owner of the Hintzen application and that 
the appellant Jerold E. Thompson was not the owner of 
such application and therefore was not entitled to change 
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the point of diversion and use of the water applied for 
by the application No. 16833 made by Martin C. Hintzen. 
Jerold E. Thompson and Ed. H. Watson, State- En-
gineer of the State of Utah prosecute separate appeals to 
this court from the judgment made and entered by the 
District Court of Iron County. This brief is filed for and 
on behalf of both of the appellants. 
There is no substantial conflict in the evidence which 
establishes the following facts : 
lTnder date of July 21st, 1945 a Uniform Real Estate 
Contract was entered into (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1) which 
contains, among others, the follo,ving provisions: 
"This agreement made in duplicate this 21st 
day of July, A.D. 1945 by and between ~Tohn C. 
~IcGarry, his assignee or assigns of Cedar City, 
Utah, hereinafter designated as the seller and M. 
C. Hintzen, hereinafter designated as the Buyer 
J of Los Angeles, California, Witnesseth: That the 
seller for the consideration herein mentioned 
agrees to sell and convey to the buyer and the 
buyer for the consideration herein mentioned 
agrees to purchase the following described real 
property situated in the County of Iron, State of 
Utah, to wit: 
The South 100 acres of the South East 
Quarter (SE%) of Section eight (8) Town-
ship 35 South, Range 16 W·est, S.L.M. 
It is agreed that in the event the buyer or 
any assignee or assignees shall make application 
to appropriate water or shall procure a certificate 
of appropriation to appropriate water from wells 
located upon said •p:remises and said buyer or as-
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signee or assignees shall thereafter default in this 
contract the seller shall immediately become the 
assignee of any such application or applications 
and the State Engineer of the State of Utah is 
hereby authorized to recognize said seller as· the 
assignee of any such application and in the event 
a certificate of appropriation has issued to the 
buyer the water rights hereunder shall be con-
sidered as appurtenant to the said premises and 
in the event of default the title thereto shall im-
mediately pass to the seller." 
So far as a;p,pears that contract was never recorded. 
Mr. Hintzen paid the full purchase price of the property 
as provided for in the contract. (Tr. 8) Mr. McGarry 
never gave a deed to Hintzen to the property. At the time 
that the above mentioned contract was entered into Hint-
zen filed the water right app,lication which forms the 
subject matter of this controversy but so far as appears 
nothing was done by Hintzen to dig a well pursuant to 
the application. The application to appropriate water so 
filed by Martin C. Hintzen was never, so far as the rec-
ord shows, approved by the State Engineer, (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 5) except by the approval of the exchange ap-
plication filed by appellant. 
In the latter part of Fehruary, 1946 McGarry ex-
changed 80 acres of the 100 acres of land described in 
the Uniform Sales Contract above mentioned for an-
other 80_ acres of land and at the same time received from 
Hintzen a purported assignment of the ap~plication in-
volved in this controversy. ( Tr. 10). The assignment how-
ever was not recorded nor filed in the office of the State 
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Engineer. (Tr. 4) (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2.) The assign-
ment was, however, filed for record in the office of the 
County Recorder of Iron County, Utah on November 2, 
1946. Mr. Hintzen ren1ained on the property described in 
the Unifor1n Sales Contract until ~fay or June, 1946. (Tr. 
8) The Uniform Sales Contract between McGarry and 
Hintzen was merely handed back to McGarry and Mc-
Garry gave Hintzen a deed to another 80 acres of land. 
(Tr. 10) 
During the first part of April, 1946 the appellant, 
Jerold E. Thompson, entered into -an agreement with 
Martin C. Hintzen where. by ltlartin C. Hintzen agreed· to 
assign to Thompson the application to app;ropriate water 
here involved and Thompson agreed to remove the brush 
from 80 acres of land for Hintzen. Pursuant to such con-
tract Thompson during the first part of Ap,ril, 1.946 did 
remove the brush as agreed. (Tr. 11) The reasonable 
value of such labor was $10.00 per acre. (Tr. 13 and Tr. 
30) In consideration for the labor in clearing the brush 
from the 80 acres of land Mr. Hintzen assigned to appel-
lant Thompson the application to ap'P'ropriate water 
which is involved in this controversy. (Tr. 11 and 12) 
(and defendants Exhibit "A") 
Prior to the time appellant Th{)mpson entered into 
the agreement with Hintzen he, Thompson, went to the 
office of the State Engineer of Utah for the purpose of 
ascertaining how he might ,acquire a water right. He had 
recently come to Utah from California and was not 
familiar with the laws touching the procedure necessary 
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to be followed to secure a right to drill wells for the pur-
pose of developing water for irigation purposes. He se-
cured from the ·office of the State Engineer the names of 
a number of people who might be the holders of a water 
right application that could be purchased. Among the 
names:.of the persons which was given to Mr. Thompson 
was that of Mr. Hintzen (Tr. 12). The appellant, Thomp-
son, contacted Mr. Hintzen and entered into the agree-
me,nt with him to remove the brush from the eight acres 
of land for the water right application here brought in 
question. Under date of April 6, 1946 Martin C. Hintzen 
and his :wJfe, Margarite C. Hintzen, assigned app~~ication 
16833 to appellant Jerold E. Thompson and on April 16, 
1946 the assignm·ent was filed in the office of the State 
Engineer. (Defendants' Exhibit "A"). The State En-
~ gineer granted the change application on March 3, 1947, 
v1hich approval required that work must he commenced 
within six months.- after the ap~proval date and diligently 
prosecuted to completion. (Defendants' Exhibit '' C' ') 
So far as appears the as~ignment of the water right ap-
plication to the respondent John C. McGarry, nor a copy 
thereof, has never been filed in the Office of the State En-
gineer of Utah. 
Soon after the State Engineer ap·proved the exchange 
application appellant Thompson caused a well to be 
drilled on the land which his wife was purchasing from 
the State of Utah and the well was finished on the last 
of May, 1947. (Tr. 15) Mr. ~hompson expended $1975.00 
in having the well drilled. (Tr. 16) Mr. Thom~pson did 
not know of any claim of Mr. McGarry to the water filing 
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In oheeking the tiaal draft of t.ll• br1et ae it 
was returned trom the printer it is n.oted that the 
AseigrL'ttents ot Error .macte by the ~3tste Jiaataeer hwe 
The state Jb181neer ll8&11D$ the tollow·tDc as 
error upoa wn1-oh he 1"911es r. th• revfJ'a,l of the 
b7 appeU&Dt 1•ol4 1. nompaen. 
(l) The ooun ef'r'eti in holdtng that Sec. lOG-J-18 
does not require th·e reeGNattoa ot the assi~td.~ of 
a water right 1n the office of the Stat.• -tneer ad 
1n holding tha-t 1ihe failu.re to eo r01::ord !las ».0 l.eaal 
etteot. 
(2) The State -taeer afSAlpts 't'he Ae·lig~ts ot 
J~rror and each o:t them. made 'try the appellant Jerold ·g. 
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in dispute until he received a notice of the p~rotest which 
was on December 20, 21 or 22nd, 1946. (Tr. 17) 
At the time 1\fr. Hintzen agreed to make and when 
he did make the assignment to Thompson·of the applica-
tion to appropriate water Hintzen stated that he still 
owned the filing, that he paid for and that he still owned 
a portion of the ground where the original application 
designated the well should be drilled. (Tr. 17) Mr. Hint-
zen told appellant Thompson that he, Hintzen, had turned 
back to 1\IcGarry ·eighty acres of the land which he had 
purchased from respondent McGarry but that he Hintzen 
retained 20 acres of the land which he had originally pur-
chased from McGarry. Hintzen further informed ap-
pellant Thompson that he Hintzen was going to have his 
father and mother come over here from Germany and 
that they were going to live on the twenty acres retained 
by Hintzen. (Tr. 19) Mr. Thompson further testified 
that he was not familiar with the amount of water neces-
sary to irrigate land. ( Tr. 20) 
The foregoing is in ·substance the evidenee upon 
which the trial court found the issues raised by the plead-
ings in favor of the respoJ?-dent and against the appellant. 
ASSIGNMENTS O·F ERROR 
The appellant Jerold E. Thompson assigns the fol-
lowing as errors upon which he relies for a reversal of 
the judgment a:p,pealed from and for a mandate of this 
court directing the trial court to enter a judgment in 
favor of the appellant Jerold E. Thompson awarding 
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to him all water rights that he might acquire under ex-
change application a-2017. 
1. The trial court erred in making the parts of its 
findings numbered 4 to 5 wherein it is in effect found that 
the plaintiff is the owner of application numbered 16833 
to appropriate 4 cubic feet per second of water. That 
such findings are without support in the evidence and 
are contrary to the evidence in that at the tin1e l\iartin 
C. Hintzen executed the purported assignment of such 
water right aplication the same had not been approved 
by the State Engineer and the said Martin C. Hintzen 
had no assignable interest in such application. (pages 
2 and 3 of complaint. R. 33-34. 
2. The trial court erred in making that p~art of its 
finding numbered 13 wherein it is found: "that the said 
Thompson knew that the well referred to in Hintzen's 
water application was, by the terms of said application, 
to be drilled upon the lands covered by Hintzen's con-
tract with McGarry and that water develO'ped therefrom 
was to be used for the irrigati.on of said land." That 
such finding is without support in the evidence and is 
contrary t~ the preponderance thereof. (Complaint page 
4, R. 35) 
3. The trial court erred in making that ·part of find-
ing numbered 13 wherein it is found that: ''Said Thomp-
son knew or should have known that an application to 
appropriate four second feet of water would not be 
granted for the irrigation of twenty acres of ground." 
That said finding is without any support in the evidence. 
(Complaint page 4, R. 35) 
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4. The trial court erred in making that part of find-
ing nun1bered 13 wherein it is found that: ''Said Thomp-
son could easily have made inquiry from McGarry con-
cerning the status of the Hintzen application and could 
have learned easily that such ap,plieation had been pre-
viously assigned by Hintzen to McGarry'' for the reason 
that such finding is immaterial. (Complaint pages 4-5, 
R. 35-36) 
5. The trial court erred in making its s-o-called find-
ing of fact number 14 and the whole thereof for the 
reason that the same is without support in the evidence, 
that the same is contrary to the evidence and the pre-
ponderance thereof. (Complaint page 5, R. 36) 
6. The trial court erred in making its conclusion of 
law numbered 1 and the whole thereof. Th~t such con-
clusion of law is without support in the findings of fact 
and is without support in the evidence. (R. 36) 
7. The trial eourt erred in making its conclusion of 
law numbered 2 in that such conclusion of law is with-
out support in lhe findings of fact and is without support 
in the evidence. ( R. 36) 
8. The trial court erred in making its conclusion 
of law numbered 3 in that such conclusion of law is not 
supported by either the findings of fact or the evidence. 
(R. 36) 
9. The trial court erred in making its conclusion of 
law numbered 4 in that such conclusion of law is without 
support in the evidence and is contrary to the law ap-
plicable to the facts as shown by the evidence. (R. 36) 
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10. The trial court erred in making its conclusion of 
law numbered 5 in that such conclusion of law is not sup-
ported by the findings of fact and is contrary to the law 
applicable to the .facts as shown by the evidence. (R. 36) 
11. The trial court erred in making its conclusion of 
law numbered 6 in that such conclusion of law is without 
support in the findings of fact and is contrary to the law 
applicable to the facts shown by the evidence. (R. 36. ) 
12. The tr.ial court erred in making its conclusion 
of law numbered 7 in that such conclusion of law is with-
out support in the findings of fact and is contrary to the 
law a'pplicable to the facts disclosed by the evidence. (R. 
37) 
13. The trial court erred in making paragraph 1 
of its decree in that said portion of the decree is without 
support either· in the evidence or the findings of fact. 
(R. 38) 
14. The trial court erred in making its paragraph 
2 of its decree in that said portion of its decree is with-
out support in either the evidence or the findings of fact, 
and is contrary to law. (R. 39) 
15. The trial court erred in making paragraph 3 
of its decree in that such paragraph is without support in 
either the evidence or the findings of fact and is contrary 
to law. (R. 39) 
16. The trial court erred in making paragraph 4 of 
its decree in that said part of the decree is without sup-
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port in either the evidence or the findings of fact. (R. 
39) 
17. The trial court erred in failing to affirm the 
order made by the State Engineer of Utah wherein and 
whereby the State Engineer approved the exchange ap-
plication of the appellant Jerold E. Thompson. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
While the appellant Thompson has made 17 assign-
ments of error the questions ·presented for review may 
be reduced to three, namely : o 
1. l\Iay one who has merely made and filed in the 
office of the State Engineer an application assign such 
application to another and thereby transfer to such as-
signee a vested interest in such ap'plication prior to the 
approval of such application by the State Eng~ineer~ 
2. Does the evidence in this ease support the find-
ing and conclusion of the trial court to the effect that the 
appellant Jerold E. Thompson was not a bona fide pur-
chaser for value of the application to ap~p~ropriate water 
which was filed by Martin C. Hintzen. 
3. l\Iay an assignee of an ap!plication to appropriate 
water defeat the right of a subsequent assignee of such 
application where the first assignee fails and neglects 
to place his assignment of record in the office of the 
State Engineer prior to the time the subsequent assignee 
has secured his assignment and placed the same of record 
in such office, especially where the first assignee has 
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12 
partici·pated in the plan to have the application placed 
in the name of the applicant~ 
We shall discuss the first two questions above sug-
gested and adopt the discussion made by the State En-
gineer touching the third question. If this court should 
conclude that the purported assignment of the applica-
tion to appropriate water by Hintzen to McGarry is and 
was a nullity it will probably not be necessary to con-
sider the other two suggested questions. 
I 
THE PURPOR.TED ASSIGNMENT OF THE HINT-
ZEN APPLICATIO·N TO APPROPRIATE WATER 
TO McGARRY WAS AND IS A NULLITY. 
While we have been unable to find an adjudicated 
case dealing with the question of whether or not an unap-
proved application to appropriate water may be assigned 
it is a well established rule of common law that the mere 
possibility or probability that a right may come into 
existence at some future time is not assignable. The law 
in such particular is thus expressed in 4 Am. Jur. Sec. 
4, page 232: 
''A mere possibility or expectancy not coupled 
with an interest cannot, at common law, be made 
the subject of a valid assignment or transfer. It is 
the general rule of law, in the absence of any 
statutory modification, that in order that a right 
or interest can be assigned, it must have at the 
time of the assignment either an actual or a po-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
tential existence. A distinction is made between 
what 'vas termed a 1nere possibility and a "pos-
sibility coupled 'vith an interest'.'' 
Numerous cases will be found collected in a foot note 
to the text which under various circumstances support the 
general rule. We shall not burden the court with an 
analysis of those cases because none of them are directly 
in point, but the principles of law therein announced 
lend son1e support to the view that the unapproved ap-
plication of Hintzen was not assignable because he had 
no vested interest to assign. 1foreover to permit such an 
assignment would offend against the provision of our 
statutory law relating to the appropriation of water. 
"It shall be the duty of the state engineer, 
upon the pa)'Illent of the approval fee, to approve 
an application if: (1) There is unappropriated 
water in the proposed source; (2) The proposed 
use will not impair existing rights, or interfere 
with the more beneficial use of the water; (3) The 
proposed plan is physically and economically 
feasible unless the application is filed by the 
United States bureau of reclamation and, would 
not prove detrimental to the public welfare; and 
( 4) The applicant has the financial ability to com-
plete the proposed works and the application was 
filed in good faith and not for the purposes of 
speculation or 1nonopoly; rprovidtetd, that where 
the state engineer, because of information in his 
possession obtained either by his own investiga-
tion or otherwise, has reason to believe . that an 
application to appropriate water will interfere 
with its more beneficial, use for irrigation, do-
mestic or culinary, stock watering, power or min-
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ing development or manufacturing, or will prove 
detrimental to the public welfare, it shall he his 
duty to withhold his approval or rejection of the 
application until he shall have investigated the 
matter. The cost of such inquiry shall be paid by 
the person making the application, as provided by 
Section 100-2-14, if such application is approved. 
If an application does not meet the requirements 
of this section, it shall be rejected." U.C.A. 1943, 
100-3-8. 
It will be observed from the provisions of the statute 
just quoted that before an a~pplication to appropriate 
water may properly he approved by the State Engineer 
it becomes his duty to make the investigation provided for 
in the portion of the section of the statute just quoted. 
If the statute has not been complied with the application 
may not be approved. 
In the absence of a showing to the contrary it must 
be assumed that the State Engineer did his duty in such 
part1cula.r and refused to approve the application unless 
and until it was amended so that the water applied for 
might be put to a beneficial use as hy statute provided. 
A few illustrations might be suggested to illustrate what 
we mean. If the State Engineer did what the statute re-
quired he might well have determined that there was no 
una;ppropriated water for use on the 100 acres covered 
by the contract between McGarry and Hintzen. It is a 
matter of common knowledge that even though there 
may be underground water available from a common 
source to irrigate say 1000 acres of land if an attempt 
is made to pump all of the available water from, at or 
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near one point it may 'Yell be that the water from dis-
tant points could not be made available. In this· connec-
tion it will be observed that the proposed place of use 
provided for in Hint.zen's filing was that the South East 
Quarter of Section 8, Township 35 South, Range 16 West, 
while the place "~here Thompson. proposes to use the 
water is the South West Quarter of Section 14, Town-
ship 35, South, Range 17 West. (Trs. Plaintiff's Ex-
hibit "B") Thus the two tracts are separated by a very 
substantial distance. It may be that the State Engineer 
in the performance of his duty concluded that there was 
no unappropriated "\Vater available on the Hintzen's 
property but there was unappropria;ted water available 
on the property purchased by lola M. Thompson, the 
wife of appellant Jerold E. Thompson. If that were so it 
was the duty of the State Engineer to withhold ap!p~roval 
of the application until such time as the application was 
amended to change the point of diversion to a place 
where water was available. 
Again it may be that the land where it was first pro-
posed the water should be used was unfit f_or use as ir-
rigated farm lands because it consist:ed of sand dunes or 
gravel or rocks or other reasons. If that were so the State 
Engineer would be derelict in his duty if he approved an 
application to appropriate water on such land. Again it 
may be that the State Engineer concluded that the ap-
p~licant did not have the financial ability to complete the 
proposed works; or that the application was not filed in 
good faith or that it was filed for purposes of specula-
tion in which case the application should not be approved 
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until these objections had been removed. That the appel-
lant Thompson was acting in good faith cannot be op.en 
to question because he expended nearly $2,000.00 to con-
struct a well within the ·six months period allowed by the 
State Engineer to begin construction. The State Engineer 
may well have concluded from an investigation and from 
other evidence available to him that respondent McGarry 
was not acting in good faith when he secured the assign-
ment of. the Htntzen application or that he secured the 
3:ssignrnent for purely speculative purposes. He was en-
gaged in buying and selling real estate. 
So far as app,ears neither Hintzen nor McGarry ever 
did anything towards drilling a well on the 100 acres of 
land described in the 1\tfcGarry-Hintzen contract. For 
some reason known only to Mr. McGarry he kept 'the 
alleged assignment of the Hintzen application in his pos-
session without filing the same with the State Engineer. 
The State Engineer could not intelligently perform the 
duties ·imposed upon him by sub-division 4 of U.C.A. 
1943, 100.::3-8 withou't being advised as to the owner of 
the .application at or p'rior to the time that he approved 
or rejected such application. 
In connection with the provisions of U.C.A. 1943, 
100-3-8 above mentioned it may he well to consider that 
part of U.C.A. 1943, 100-3-18 wherein it is provided that: 
''Prior to issuance-of certificate of a ppropria-
tion, rights claimed under applications for the ap-
p-ropriation of water may be transferred or as-
signed by instruments in writing. Such instru-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
·ments, when acknowledged or proved and certi-
fied in the n1anner provided by law for the ack-
nowledgment or proving of conveyances of real 
estate, may be filed in the office of the state en-
gineer and shall from tin1e of filing of same in 
said office impart notice to all persons of the con-
tents thereof. Notices of claims to underground 
water filed pursuant to the provisions of section 
100-5-12 may be transferred or assigned by in-
struments in writing in the manner herein pro-
vided.'' 
While the statute last quoted does not expressly refer 
to an approved application for the appropriation of 
water it does speak of rights claimed under such an ap-
plication. The language rights claimed must necessarily 
apply only to an approved app,lic.ation because until the 
application is approved there can be no rights. The only 
possible right that an applicant to appropriate water 
has prior to its approval is the right to have the State 
Engineer pass upon the application by either approv-
ing or rejecting the same. Whether the same shall be 
approved or rejected depends upon the status of the 
applicant or his assignee at the time of the approval; 
that is to say, whether the holder of the application is 
entitled to an approval pursuant to the Jl'rovision of 
U.C.A. 1943, 100-3-8, heretofore quoted. When Mr. Hint-
zen, by the assignment of his application to Mr. Thomp-
son, informed the State Engineer that he had parted with 
any right he may have in the application the State En-
gineer was called upon to act upon the application as 
the same then existed. That is what the State Engineer 
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did when he' approved defendant's Exhibit "C" desig-
nated as the ''Change Application Approved.'' 
There is nothing in the pleadings or in the evidence, 
or in the findings of fact or conclusion of law which 
show or tend to show that Mr. McGarry had or could 
have met the requirements of U.C.A. 1943, 100-3-8 to 
entitle him to have the original application of Mr~ ~int­
zen a'pproved and thereby breath life into his so-called 
assignment of the Hintzen application. 
The entire case presented by the respondent is bot-
tomed on the false assumption that the mere filing of 
an application to appropriate water gives the applicant 
a vested right in some water. If that be so our statutory 
laws, and particularly Section 100-3-8, is rendered mean-
ingless. If the mere filing of an application gives the 
applicant a right to the public waters of this state then 
indeed would it be an easy matter to secure a monopoly 
of the public waters of this state contrary to the pro-
visions of U.C.A. 1943, 100-3-8. 
We do not wish to be understood as contending that 
the State Engineer may arbitrarily or capriciously re-
fuse to ap1prove an application to appropriate waters 
but we do contend that the assignment of an unapproved 
application does not give the assignee a vested interest 
in such unapproved application and that before the as-
signee of an una'P:proved application to appropTiate 
water has any standing in court he must show that he 
meets the requirements of section 100-3-8. 
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· Moreover, before a court is authorized to reverse 
the State Engineer in refusing to recognize as valid an 
assignment of an unapproved application to appropriate 
the water such assignee must show at least that he meets 
the requirements of U.C.A. 100-3-8. That in the absence 
of such a sho,ving the action of the State Engineer is not 
vulnerable to attack by such purported assignee. In the 
absence of ·proof to the contrary the courts will assume 
that the State Engineer has performed the· duties im-
posed upon him by law. 
II 
JEROLD E. THOMPSON WAS A BONA FIDE PUR-
CHASER FOR ':ALUE OF THE HINTZEN APPLI-
CATION TO APPROPRIATE WATER. 
If we are right in what has heretofore been said 
there would seem to be no occasion to be concerned about 
the other two questions heretofore suggested in this brief. 
If the respondent acquired no vested interest cognizable 
in a court of law by reason of the purported assignment 
of the Hintzen application to app:ropria:te water then 
and in such case the respondent had no grounds to com-
plain of the order of the State Engineer granting the 
application of appellant Thompson to change the place 
of the diversion and use of the Hintzen application. On 
the other hand if Thompson is not entitled to prevail on 
such ground then it becomes necessary to consider the 
other prop:ositions. 
There can be no doubt that appellant Thompson per-
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formed labor for Hintzen in clearing brush from 80 acres 
of the land owned by Hintzen and that the value of such 
labor wa.s $10.00 per acre or a total of $800 .. 00. The evi .. 
dence so shows and there is no evidence to the contrary .. 
There is no evidence which shows or tends to show 
that the ·,appellant Thompson knew that Hintzen had as-
signed the application to Mr. McGarry. The evidence is 
that Mr. Hintzen assured Mr. Thompson that he had 
not assigned the application to Mr. McGarry and that 
he, Thompson, did not know of any such claim being 
made until he, in December 1946, received notice of the 
£~act that Mr. McGary had filed a protest to the grant-
ing of Thompson's application to change the place of 
diversion and use of the Hintzen application to the lands 
'vhich had been purchased by Mrs. Thompson, the wife 
of appellant Thompson. Apparently the basis for the 
trial court's finding that Thompson was not a bona fide 
purch1aser was because Thompson knew that ~{cGarry 
had sold the 100 acres of land for the irrigation of which 
Hintzen had made an application with the State Engineer 
to approp-riate water and that Hintzen had returned a 
part of such land back to McGarry. 
It will be noted from the statement of the case here-
tofore set qut in this brief that it was MeGarry who par-
ticipated in and approved the plan for Mr. Hintzen to 
make the application in his oWn. name, notwithstanding 
the land stood in the name of Mr. McGarry. 
It will also be recalled that Thompson was not 
familiar with the procedure necessary to acquire the 
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right to the use of underground 'vater and that before 
making the deal with Hintzen he 'yent to the office of 
the State Engineer to ascertain. ho"\v and from who1n he 
could secure a W'"ater right and that Thompson was, at 
the office of the State Engineer, given the names of a 
number of persons 'vho, according to the records of the 
State Engineer, had filed applications to appropriate 
water, among them being 1\fr. Hintzen. That with this 
information in mind Thompson took up negotiations with 
Hintzen for the purchase of the Hintzen application with 
the result that he acquired from Hintzen an assignment 
of his application. 
In its finding numbered 13 the trial court seems to 
attach considerable im·portance to the fact that the Hint-
. 
zen application was to appropriate four c.f.s. We are at 
a loss to understand the significance of such finding. If 
a stream of four cubic feet per second is the most eco-
nomical stream to be used in the irrigation of lands in 
the area here involved such a stream would be the proper 
size of. a stream to use for the irrigation of 40 acres or 
20 acres of land as well as for the irrigation of 160 acres 
of land. We are not familiar with the practice of the State 
Engineer in the matter of allowing application for a 
water right in the vicinity of the lands here involved but 
we do venture the statement that if the State Engineer 
allows a filing of 4 c.f.s. for 160 acres of land and pro-
portionately reduces the filings for smaller acreage so 
that only 0 of a second foot of water may be used for the 
irrigation of 20 acres of land it is high time that the State 
Engineer revised his rulings in such particular. 
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It is doubtful if lj2 of a second foot of water would be 
of any substantial value in irrigating 20 acres of land 
or any other quantity except possibly a garden. We know 
of no valid reason why a stream of 4 c.f.s. may not be al-
lowed for the irrigation of 20 acres of land as well as 
160. Of course we can well appreciate that the person with 
160 acres of land would have the use of 4 c.f.s. for a 
period of eight times longer than the ·person with 20 
acres of land. To conclude that ~fr. Thompson is charge-
able with notice that Mr. Hintzen had parted with his 
claim to the filing which stood in his name in the office 
of the State Engineer because of the stre~am applied for 
by Hintzen would be to charge Thompson with knowl-
edge of something which few, if any, farmers who irri-
gate their lands would know or ever suspect. 
In paragraph 2 of the court's findings of fact there 
is set out that ~part of the contract between Hintzen and 
McGarry, wherein it is provided that in the event the 
purchaser M·. C. Hintzen made application to appropriate 
water from wells to he drilled on the said· premises and 
thereafter defaulted in the performance of his contract 
the seller should i1nmediately become the assignee of said 
application and in the event a certificate of appropriation 
had issued to the buyer the water right represented there-
by should he considered as appurtenant to the said 
premises. 
We are at a loss to see wherein such provision aids 
the respondent. It is not claimed and there is no evidence 
which shows or tends to show that appellant knew that 
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there \Yere any such provisions in the Hintzen-McGarry 
contract. Hintzen did not default in his contract and no 
certificate of appropriation ever issued. Horeover, water 
may not be made appurtenant to land, especially as to 
third parties by an unrecorded contract. This court is 
committed to the doctrine that an application to ap,pro-
priate water is not appurtenant to land. Duchle·sne 
County, et al, vs. Hu1nphr.eys, et ,az., 106 Utah 332; 148 
Pac. ( 2d) 338. 
It does not appear in the case just cited whether or 
not the application to ap:propriate water had been ap-
proved. It is there also held that ''no vested water rights 
were ever acquired and therefore could not have passed 
to the county as appurtenant to land which it obtained by 
i~s tax sale.'' In this case no application was ever ap-
proved ~permitting the appropriation of water to the 
land described in the Hintzen-McGarry contract. Thus 
no right to the use of water on such land was ever ini-
tiated. There was nothing, except the mere filing of a 
paper in the office of the State Engineer, that could he-
come appurtenant to the land. 
The above mentioned provision of the Hintzen-Mc-
Garry contract contemplates that an attempt would be 
made to secure water to irrigate the land described in 
such contract. That respondent McGarry sought to have 
Hintzen make an ap:plication in his own name to appro-
priate water for the land in question is readily conceded. 
By such means the respondent held out to the world that 
Martin C. Hintzen was the owner of the ap~plication. Re-
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spondent is chargeable with knowledge of the various 
provisions of the law which requires that the office of the 
State Engineer is required to keep public records of the 
owners of water rights within the state of Utah. Respond.., 
ent must also have known that one who seeks to ascertain 
who are holders of applications to appropriate the pub-
lic waters of this state would of necessity seek such in-
forlnation in the office of the State Engineer. That is the 
only public office in the State of Utah where such in-
formation may be had. Respondent is not only charge-
able with such knowledge because it is the law of this 
sta t'e but the fact, as he testified at the trial, of his being 
in the real estate business in and about Cedar City and 
Iron County for 14 years, makes it obvious that the re-
spondent was in fact familiar with the law in such par-
ticular. Notwithstanding the respondent is chargeable 
with and had actual knowledge of the method and manner 
of filing on the public waters of this state the respondent 
caused and permitted the only public records of the 
State of Utah to proclaim to every one that Hintzen was 
the owner and holder of the application to appropriate 
water involved in this controversy. That state of facts 
continued until after Tho1npson had performed labor of 
the value of $800.00 for Hintzen in clearing land in con-
sideration of Hintzen's assigning to Thompson the ap-
plication to appropriate water. Indeed that state of facts 
continued to exist until after Thompson made his ap-
plication to change the point of diversion of the water 
applied for in Hintzen's application. 
It is the position of Thompson that such· a state o~ 
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facts precludes ~[~Garry from now asserting that his 
assignment is superior to that of Thompson. 
The eases dealing "~ith estopple in its various phases 
and kindred rules of la'v are exceedingly nuinerous and 
it has frequently been said that each case must depend 
upon its o'Yn facts. There are, however, well defined 
principles of law that serve as a guide to a proper con-
elusion in any particular case, among them being: 
"A party may be estopped to insist upon a 
claim, asse-rt an objection or take a position which 
is inconsistent with an admission which he has 
previously made and in reliance upon which the 
other party has c;hanged his position." 19 Am. 
Jur. Sec. 63, page 681. 
''The doctrine of estoppel by negligence is an 
application of the general principle of equity 
which is further discussed under this title, that 
when oile of two innocent persons-that is, per-
sons eaeh guiltless of an intentional moral wrong, 
must suffer a loss it must be borne by that one of 
them who, by his conduct, has rendered the in-
jury possible." 19 Am. Jur .. , Sec. 67, page 695. 
Our Supreme Court referred to and applied this 
doctrine in the case of Harrison vs. Auto Security Co., 
et al, 257 Pac. 677, 679: 
''An estoppel will arise against the real owner 
however where he clothes the person assuming 
to dispose of the property with the apparent title 
to it or with apparent authority to dispose of it 
when the person setting up the estopp:el acts and 
parts with value or extends credit on the faith 
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of such apparent ownership or authority." 19 Arn. 
Jur., Sec. 68, pages 696 and 697. 
''When the record title . to real property 
stands in the name of one man another, who is 
the real owner, may be estopped from setting up 
his title or interest." 19 Am. Jur. Sec. 112, pages 
764, 765. 
Cases will be found cited in foot notes to the fore-
going texts in support thereof. An instructive annota-
tion will be found in 50 A.L.R. 730, 731. 
) 
The respondent in this case took part in having the 
ap•plication to appropriate water here in question pl'aced 
in the name of another, thereby holding out to the "\vorld 
that such other was the owner of the application notwith-
standing the legal title to the land where the water was 
to be appropriated stood in the name of respondent. He 
for reasons knoWn only to him failed to record the pur-
ported assignment from Hintzen. Under such a state of 
facts res·p:Ondent may not now successfully claim his 
assignment superior to that of Thompson. 
It may be argued that appellant, not having pleaded 
estoppel, may not rely upon such doctrine. There is no 
magic in the use of the word '' es'toppel'' in a pleading. 
If the facts pleaded constitute an estoppel that is suf-
ficient. That is especially so in a suit to quiet title. In 
effect this is such a suit. Haskins vs. Tulley, 29 N.M. 
173; 270 Pac. 1007. Campbell vs. S. and Tr. Co., 63 Utah 
366; 226 P. 190; Gibson vs. M:cCurren, 37 Utah 
158; 106 Pac. 669. If Thompson may not rely upon the 
princi·ples of estoppel because not pleaded by the same 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
27 
token respondent may not rely upon his claim of notice 
because not pleaded. 
It seems to have been the view of the trial court that 
Tho1npson should haYe made further inquiry as to 
\Vhether or not }!cGarry claimed any interest in the ap-
plication. He, Thompson, did make inquiry at the office of 
the State Engineer \vhere Hintzen was the record owner 
of the "\Vater right application in question and further 
learned that Hintzen was willing to assign or transfer 
the same to Thompson upon his clearing the lands 
claimed by Hintzen. In light of the fact that respondent 
had been instrumental in having the water right appli-
cation placed and permitted to stand in the name of Hint-
zen the situation \vas similar to· a case where one states 
that he is not the owner of land and has no interest there-
in and later without revoking such statement comes into 
court and the~e seeks to escape the consequence of his 
statement by saying that he had changed his mind before 
the injured ·-p~erson acted upon such statement; that be-
fore one may safely rely upon such statement he must 
seek out the person making the statement to ascertain if 
he had changed his mind. Possibly ·such procedure would 
incense the person making the statement and cause him 
to retort that if and when he changed his mind he would 
let that fact be known by placing his assignment of rec-
ord in the prop,er office. 
If Thompson had gone and made inquiry at the of-
fice of the county recorder of Iron County or had secured 
an abstract of the prop:erty standing in the name of the 
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respondent he would have found nothing to enlighten 
him. He would doubtless have learned that respondent 
owned or claimed to own the land upon which Hintzen 
held an application to appropriate water and nothing 
n1ore. That was the situation when Hintzen made the 
application by and with the consent, approval and in-
stigation of the respondent. 
A situa.tion not unlike the one here presented was 
involved in the case of Wooley vs. Dowse, 86 Utah 221; 
41 Pac. (2d) 709. It is there held that ·purchasers of water 
stock may rely on the stock record unless they have actual 
knowledge that stock has been mortgaged, pledged or 
disposed of or unless there is some other circumstance 
\vhich would charge them with notice other than mere 
lmowledge that .some previous owner declared water to 
be appurtenant. 
"That one who buys water stock actually 
knew that former certificate stated that water rep-
resented by certificate bel{)nged to certain tract of 
land when he knew that no water was being used 
on such land would not charge him with duty of 
searching chain of title to land to see whether in-
struments on county recorder's record dealt with 
such water." 
The foregoing quotation is from the sylla·bus of the 
case above cited and reflects the opinion of the court. 
The facts in the foregoing case were much weaker, 
as we read the opinion, in support of the conclusion that 
the purchaser of the water stock was a bona fide pur-
chaser, than are the facts in this case in favor of a hold-
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ing that defendant Thon1pson was a bona fide purchaser 
of the application to appropriate water which forms 
the subject matter of this controversy. 
It should he noted that the reason the application 
here involved is of great value to Tho1npson is because 
the Governor of Utah has issued a public proclam~tion 
pursuant to Sec. 100-8-1, U.C.A. 1943, declaring that no 
more water may be acp·propriated in the area where Hint-
zen filed his application to appropriate water. 
III 
THE RE·SPONDENT McGARRY \VAS REQUIRED 
TO FILE HIS ASSIG·NMEN·T WITH THE STATE 
ENGINEER IN ORDER TO HAVE PRIORITY OVER 
THE RECORDED ASSIGNMENT TO· THOMPSON. 
Most of the points of law involved in the instant 
case have no general importance and the state engineer 
has no interest in the result reached by the court in de-
ciding them. There is one proposition, however, which 
the state engineer considers of utmost importance to the 
administration of his office. For that reason an ap:peal 
was taken. Let it be said at the outset that the state en-
gineer is not interested in which of these two individuals 
ultimately succeeds in getting this water. The state en-
gineer does not as a policy come to the aid of one water 
claimant as against another in litigation of this type. 
It is for this reason that he did not participate in the 
submission of the evidence in the trial court. Where, how-
ever, an important principle of law is involved which 
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will affect the administration of his office the state en-
gineer deems it advisable to join in the appeal and to 
submit his views for the consideration of the court. 
The principle point with which the state engineer 
is concerned is the holding that Sec. 100-3-18 does not re-
quire the recordation of an assignment of a water right. 
Plaintiff asserts that his failure to record is of no con-
sequence whatever because the statute itself does not 
expressly provide any penalty for failure to record or 
file with the state engineer. It is not often that cases 
directly in point from the same jurisdiction are avail-
able and reasoning must often he done by analogy. Here, 
however, there is a Utah Supreme Court opinion ~hich 
also was appealed to and affirmed by the United States 
Supreme Court which is directly in point. We are at loss 
to explain why the trial court should attempt to overrule 
it. Before analyzing this Utah case we desire to call 
specific attention to the language of Sec. 100-3-18, U.C.A. 
19'43, and to the general statutory pattern in Utah for 
the recordation of water rights. 
Sec. 100-3-18, in part provides : 
''Prior to issuance of certificate of appro-
priation, rights claimed under applications for 
the appropriation of water may he transferred or 
assigned by instruments in writing. Such instru-
ments, when acknowledged or proved and certified 
in the manner provided by law for the acknowledg-
ment or p:roving of conveyance of real estate, may 
be filed and recorded in the office of the state 
engineer, and shall from the time of filing the 
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sa1ne be recorded in said off'ic,e inlpnTt notice t1o 
all persons of the contents therreof." (Em~phasis 
added) 
This is only one of several Utah statutes relating to 
the recordation of \Yater rights. Sec. 100-1-10 and 100-
1-11 pro,ide for the recordation of perfected rights. 
Similar provisions have 'been in the law since 1905, with 
various amendments since that time. In 1945 Sec. 100-
1-10 was amended. See Chapter 134, Laws of Utah 1945 . 
.... -\s amended this section requires the county recorder to 
transfer to the state engineer copies of all transfers of 
water rights recorded under the ~pTovisions of 100-1-10 
with the county recorder. 
Sec. 100-5-12, U.C.A. 1943, (enacted in 1935) requires 
registration of all claims to underground water. These 
are to be recorded with the state engineer. Thus diligence 
rights to underground water are by this last cited See. 
(100-5-12) to be recorded; all transfers of perfected 
water rights are to be recorded with the county recorder, 
and by the provisions of 100-1-10, as amended in 1945, 
certified copies must be filed with the state engineer. 
These cover all diligence rights to underground water 
and all perfect,ed rights to any kind of water. Section 
100-3-18 completes the statutory pattern by providing 
for the recordation of transfer& of unperfected water 
rights. 
In Sutherland Statutory Construction, 3rd Edition, 
by Horack, published in 1943, certain rules of construc-
tion are set forth for interpreting recording statutes. 
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This material is contained at Section 7003, •page 362, Vol. 
3. It is there stated: 
''Recording statutes are enacted for the pro-
tection of the public, so that subs·equent good faith 
creditors will be put on notice of prior trans-
actions which may affect their title or security 
interest, and these statutes are usually given a 
liberal interpr~tation to accomplish this purpose 
* * *. The recording statutes are generally con-
strued so that the subsequent purchaser in good 
faith is protected against prior purchasers al-
though the subsequent purchaser has not recorded-
his transaction. Likewise, the technical formalities 
in recording are so1ne times overlooked to accom-
plish an equitable operation of the statute." 
This same concept is expressed in 53 Corpus Juris, 
page 606, which provides as follows : 
''Although it has been held that recording 
acts can~ot he extended by implication, but must 
be construed literally in absence of ambiguity 
or language requiring judicial interp~retation, re-
cording statutes are remedial, and should be lib-
erally construed so as to attain the object intended 
by them. The design of recording laws is to pre-
vent fraud in transactions by securing certainty 
and publicity in such dealing; their whole object is 
to permit and require the public to act with the 
presumption that recorded instruments exist and 
are genuine; and they should not be construed to 
produce fraud, but sa as ~to p·revent it.'' 
To the same effect see Lewis v. State, 32 Ariz. 182, 
256 P. 1048; Clark v. Green, 73 Minn., 467, 76 N.W. 263; 
Akerberg v. McCraney, 141 Minn .. , 2:30 169 N.W. 802. 
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THE UTAH ·CASES 
Sec. 100-3-18, as quoted above, was enacted in 1919 
and has re1nained substantially unchanged. In approach-
ing the lTtah case 'vhich "\Ye think is squarely in point, 
the court should keep in mind that Sec. 100-3-18, express-
ly ·provides that an assignment filed with the state en-
gineer \vill constitute notice to all persons of its con-
tents. If it were not the intent of the Legislature to re-
quire recordation for the protection of good faith pur-
chasers what possible use would be the provision that 
such recordation shall impart constructive notice~ This 
thought played an important role in the Utah case dis-
cussed immediately below. 
The case which "\Ye think is directly in point is Wells, 
Fargo & C.a. v. Smith, 2 Utah 39. The case was ap,pealed 
to the U.S. Supreme Court and was there aftirmed. See 
N eslin v. Wells, 104 U. S. 428. 
This Utah case involved the construction of early 
territorial statutes which provided for the recordation of 
transfers of land. Until 187 4 the territorial statutes con-
tained no provision whatever prescribing the conse-
qt~;ences of failure to record. In this regard the statute 
under construction by the Utah Supreme Court and by 
the U. S. Supreme Court is a direct parallel to See:. 
100-3-18. Both statutes are silent as to the consequences 
of a failure to record. The cases are also alike in this : 
The statute under construction in the Wells, Fargo case 
did not use mandatory language to require the trans-
feree to record the transfer. The statute merely per-
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mitted him to file and provideed that in event he did file 
the recorded instrument could be introduced in 
Court as evidence of the transaction. ·se·c. 100-3-18 is 
much stronger and could well be construed as making 
recording mandatory. Let us however assume, for the 
purpose of argument, that it is only directory because 
it provides that such a transfer of an application "may" 
be filed. The use of the word "may" might lead the 
court to construe the statute as being permissive rather 
than mandatory. Concede this to be true and even then 
the case is a direct parallel to the Wells, Fargo case, as 
both the Utah court and the U. S. Supreme Court held 
that the statute under construction for recording of land 
transactions was merely permissive rather than manda-
tory. 
We then have two direct parallels in this case and 
the Wells, Fargo case. (1) neither statute being con-
strued contained any proviso enumerating the conse-
quences of failure to rec?rd and, ( 2) neither statute re-
quired a filing; the language used indicating that £ping 
was merely permissive. · 
The statute in question, Sec. 100-3-18, is stronger 
for us than wa.s the statute in the Wells, Fargo case, in 
that it ex·pressly provides that an instrument recorded 
pursuant to the statute will impart constructive notice 
to the world. The statute in the Wells, Fargo case left 
such e;onclusion to inference. 
The facts of the Wells, Fargo case were as follows: 
one Smith was indebted to Wells, Fargo in the sum of 
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$17,000, represented by a promissory note dated July 
15, 1S73. Smith induced one John W. Keer to indemnify 
the payee on said note, and to secure Kerr, Smith gave 
hin1 a mortgage dated September 27, 1873, and Kerr as-
signed the n1ortgage to Wells, Fargo as collateral securi-
ty for the note of Sn1ith held by them. Neither Kerr nor 
,,~ells, Fargo had any actual notice of any prior liens on 
the mortgaged land. They recorded their mortgage on 
September 29, 1873. Smith was in possession of the mort-
gaged premises and he continued in possession. On No-
vember 27, 1872, Smith had delivered to one N eslin a 
prior note for $7,000 and a prior mortgage on the same 
property described in the later mortgage to Kerr. Nes-
lin did not record his mortgage until after the mortgage 
to Kerr had been recorded. We thus had a situation ex-
actly like that presented in the instant case. N eslin held 
the first mortgage but failed to record it. Thereafte,r 
Kerr obtained ·a mortg,age ·On the s1arme p·remises and f"!e-
corded it. The Supreme Court said that the single ques-
tion in the case was "whether, under the laws of Utah in 
force at the time of the transaction a junior mortgage, 
taken without notice of a prior mortgage, a~tual or con-
structive, and first recorded, is to be preferred in its 
lien to a mortgage prior in execution but subsequently 
recorded.'' The statutes which were then in effect are 
analyzed by the United States Su~p-reme Court decision in 
some detail so that I will not requote them here. Suf-
fice it to say that the statutes in question were territorial 
statutes enacted in 1855. The statute p'ermitte'd recorda-
tion of a mortgage but did not require it. It pTovided no 
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consequence for failure to record. Both the Utah Supreme 
Court and the United States Supreme Court held that 
the failure to record under such a statute took from N es-
lin any advantage he gained from the fact that his mort-
gage was executed a year earlier than the mortgage of 
Kerr. The United States Supreme Court said: 
''The Legislation on the subject prior to 187 4, 
it will be observed, did not require that the mort-
gage should be recorded in order to be valid, anu 
did not in terms declare what should be the legal 
effect of recording or omitting to record it. 
"That Legislation cannot, however, be as-
s tuned to be without significance, and its pre-
cise meaning must be determined, not only by 
what it expresses but by what it necessarily inl-
p~lies. 
''There can be no reasonable doubt, we think, 
that the records which the county recorder is 
bound to keep, which private persons are author-
ized to employ for recording their instruments 
and evidences of title, and which the public have a 
right to inspect, have all the qualities that attach 
to public records. · 
* * * * 
"It is a mere corollary from this datum that 
these records are, by construction of law, notice 
. to all persons of what they contain. (In Sec. 100-
3-18, this is expressly provided). Their contents 
are matters of public knowledge, because the law 
requires them to be kept, authorizes them to be 
used, and secures to all p·ersons access to them, in 
order that the knowledge of them may be public, 
and, therefore, imputes to all interested in it that 
knowledge the opportuni:ty to acquire which it has 
provided. The law assumes the fulfilment and not 
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the defeat of its o'vn ends. It will not per1nit its 
policy to be gainsaid, not even by a plea of per ... 
sonal ignorance of its existence or extent. * * * * 
The provisions of the law in reference to these 
records either haYe no purpose at all,-,vhich we 
haYe no right to assume,-or their purpose was, 
that the public might have kno,vledge of the titles 
to real estate of 'vhieh they are the registers. It 
'vould utterly defeat that purpose not to presume 
'Yith conclusive force that the notice which it was 
their office to communicate had reached the party 
interested to receive it; for, if every man was at 
liberty to say he had failed to acquire the knowl-
edge it was important for him to have, because he 
had not taken the trouble to search the record 
which the la"'" had provided for the expres~ pur-
pose of giving it to him, then the ignorance which 
it was the public interest and policy to pr,event 
would become universal, and the law would fail 
because it refused to make itself respected.'' 
It must be emphasized that the reasoning of the 
Supreme Court to reach the result of constructive notice 
is not really needed here because Sec. 100-3-18 exp-ressly 
provides that the instrument recorded pursuant to the 
section will impart notice of its contents. 
The single question left is whether or not the failure 
expressly to provide a consequence for failure to record 
makes the failure to record of no consequence. As noted 
by the Supreme Court there simply could be no purpose 
in this statute in imparting constructive notice to all per-
sons unless all persons are to have the right to rely on 
the public record. It would be the rankest injustice to 
hold that this statute imparts notice to the world and is 
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binding on all if recorded and yet to hold as did the trial 
court that the public could not rely on the record made. 
Why bind the public to take notice of the record if, after 
having taken notice of it, they cannot rely on it~ Of what 
possible good would such a statute be except as a trap 
for the public~ If they check the pu·blic record and find 
title to be of record in the name of John Doe they should 
with perfect safety be allowed to take from John Doe 
and to pay him value therefor. Such was the conclusion 
reached both by Utah Supreme Court and the United 
States· Su·preme Court, for the United States Supreme 
Court went on to say: 
"The statutes under consideration, it is true, 
do not in e:np,re.ss terms make it obligatory upon 
one ·t,aking a conveyanc,e of or incumbrance upon 
re,al es:t1at.e to record it. The recording is not made 
essential to its validity as between the parties; 
no.r i:s it declared that the f~ailure t;o neoor~d shall 
postp·one its ope'rlation iJn "favor of a subsequent 
bona fide purchaser for valrue wi.thout wotice. And 
yet the implication is very st'rong that the latter 
efferJt; must be in~ended by it. Otherwise what valu-
able and sufficient purpose is there in construing 
the record to be constructive notice of its contents, 
except to protect such a purchaser~ If, without 
recording, the conveyance is not only valid be-
tween the parties, but good also as against the 
vvorks, with or without notice, of what public 
value or use is the provision for keeping such 
a record and declaring it to be public, open to the 
examination of all pers'ons ~ On that supposition, 
its only purpose would he in the p:rivate interest of 
proprietor to furnish a convenient and cheap: mode 
of supplying proof, by certified copies, in case of 
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the loss of destruction of title-pap.ers. But even 
that purpose is not exiJressly declared. It is only 
an inference based on the nature of the record as 
public, and the objects 'vhich, under the system of 
registration adopted in this country, in colonial 
times, and 'vhich has since prevailed universally 
in all the States, have been sought to he attained 
by it. The chief of these is to secure that publicity 
in respect of the transfer of titles which, in the 
earlier history of the common law, was effected by 
livery of seisin, and later, by the substituted ·en-
rolment of conveyances by way of bargain and 
sale; and 'Yhich had in view, as its principal pur-
pose, the protection of innocent purchasers from 
frauds which might be practiced by means of 
secret conveyances. 
''To hold otherwise would be to declare that 
land should cease generally to be the subject of 
sale; for no amount of diligence on the part of a 
p~urchaser would insure . his title. He would, of 
course, demand of the vendor a:ri inspection of his 
title-deeds. From them he would learn the chain 
of title." 
The United States Supreme Court discussed this· 
concept for about eight pages. It clearly holds that the 
only purpose that there could possibly be for making 
public records constructive notice of their contents is 
to protect innocent purchasers dealing with the record 
title holder. The Utah Supreme Court held exactly the 
same thing. There was a dissenting o;pinion based upon 
the doctrines argued by the plaintiff in this case. Those 
contentions were expressly over-ruled and the position 
taken by the state engineer in this case was expressly 
affirmed. 
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There has been no need for a further decision by 
the Utah ,Court construing our statutes regarding re-
cordation of land transfers, for in 187 4 the statute under 
consideration in the Wells, Fargo case was amended ex-
p.ressly to provide that the failure to record would make 
a conveyance void against the subsequent purchaser 
without notice. I have Sheppardized the Utah case and 
state that it has not been over-ruled. I have also checked 
the United States Supreme Court case in Sheppard's 
Citator and find that it has been cited by some state 
courts with approval and that it has never been over-
ruled. 
WHY IS THIS O,F INTEREST TO THE STArE 
ENGINEER 
The state engineer is alarmed over the holding that 
some third party may hold title to an unapproved ap-
. . 
plication without ever recording that assignment with 
the state engineer. By Sec. 100-3-8 the Legislature has 
imposed certain duties upon the state engineer. Those 
duties cannot be faithfully discharged unless the state 
engineer knows who the owner of the water application 
is. For example the state engineer has to determine 
whether or not it will be detrimental to the public wel-
fare to approve an application. Certainly a determina-
tion of this question will often require knowledge con-
cerning the owner of the application. If the owner were 
a speculator who never intended to farm the land him-
self or to drill a well the ap'Plication might well be denied 
in favor of a pending application filed by a farmer who 
\ 
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certainly would develop and beneficially use the water. 
There is no possible way that the state engineer can as-
certain \Yhether or not the approval of the application 
1night 'prove detrimental to the public \Yelfare unless he 
kno,vs the applicant. 
Further he is required to determine whether or, not 
the applicant has the financial ability to p~erfect the ap-
plication. Sec. 100-3-8 expressly so provides. If the ap-
plication Gan stand of record in one name and yet be 
owned by someone else it is a fraud on the State En-
gineer. An application held by a large corporation might 
readily be approved even though the proposed plan of 
development were costly and, on the other hand, be de-
_, 
nied if it were known to be held by someone who was a 
bankrupt or a S'p:eculator. 
The State Engineer has to determine whether or 
not the approval of an application will create or tend to 
create a monopoly. This can only he known if the ap:pli-
cant or owner of the application is known. There< are 
literally dozens of similar p:roblems all of which require 
that the applicant be known. 
Further the State Engineer is required by statute 
to investigate an application to ascertain whether or not 
the lands to he irrigated are suitable for irrigation. It 
is unlikely that the State Engineer would approve an ap ... 
plication to irrigate the lands covered by the original_ ap-
plication. The court records. will show that this ap;plica-
tion was pending in the office of the State Engineer with-
out approval from the summer of 1945 until the applica-
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tion was approved in March of 1947. See defendant's Ex-
hibit "C." It was only approved after the apparent rec-
ord o'vner had filed a change application showing an in-
tention to irrigate a different tract of land. The record 
in this case indicates that the plain tiff McGarry is a real 
estate agent and that he has dealt with the sale of land 
and the appropriation of water in the office of the State 
Engineer. He might well have occupied an entirely dif-
ferent position in the eyes of the State Engineer had the 
application been fi.led in his name, or had it been trans-
ferred to his name before approval. 
l\fcGarry in this case caused the application original-
ly to be filed in the name of Hintzen even though he had 
some contract by which he, McGarry, attempted to re-
tain some control over the application which Hintzen 
filed. Nothing was done to bring this fact situation to the 
attention of the State Engineer. Thereafter Hintzen pur-
ported to assign the water right to 1\fcGarry and McGar-
ry continued to let the record show that Hintzen owned 
the water_ right. Thompson, as a member of the ·public, 
came and examined the records in the office of the State 
Engineer. From those public records, which, by Sec. 100-
3-18, impart notice to the world of their contents, Thomp-
son ascertained that Hintzen was the owner of record. 
He paid $800 in service to acquire the application. There-
after he recorded his application and for all the State 
Engineer knew he was the owner thereof. He filed an 
ap•plication to change the point of diversion and the place 
of use and this change was granted and permission was 
given to dri]l a well. 
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It """ould be an open and palpable fraud on the office 
of the State Engineer an'd on Thon1pson to per1nit Mc-
Garry to obtain an approved application in this manner. 
Such a procedure deprives the State Engineer of the op-
portu~it.y to investigate the various things which the 
Legislature has told him by Sec. 100-3-8 to investigate. 
It is contrary both to the spirit and to the letter of 
the law to permit ~IcGarry to be the secret owner of this 
application and have the State Engineer approve the ap-
plication after investigating the financial responsibility 
and other matters relatng to Thompson. McGarry gets 
an approved application because of the financial picture 
and other pictures ·presented by Thompson; he gets an 
approved application for a tract of land which may have 
been, in the opinion of the State Engineer, unfit for cul-
tivation. It has deprived the State Engineer of an op-
portunity even to investigate such conditions. It is con-
trary to the holding of the Utah SupTeme Court and of 
the United States Sup:reme Court. If this opinion of the 
lower court be affirmed it will. constitute a license to 
speculators to cause applications to stand of· record in 
the name of dirt farmers in hopes that the same will be 
approved while knowing that they might not ever be ap-
proved if they stand in the name of the speculator. 'This, 
of course, could be done ·anyway, but if the speculator 
elects to ~onceal the fact of ownership: from the State 
Engineer and from the public he should bear the burden 
and the risk of loss because some innocent third party 
purchased the water right not knowing of the secretly 
reserved interest. 
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Such is exactly what is hap·pening in the instant 
case. Thompson examined the records to ascertain who 
the true owner was. McGarry, for reasons not reflected 
in the record, elected to conceal the fact of ownership by 
him. Tho1npson expended $800 to acquire a right and all 
the time was dealing with the record owner. The StatE~ 
Engineer followed the la~t enunciated policy of the State 
Supren1e Court set forth in the Wells-Fargo case and 
treated Thompson as the owner. By so considering 
Thompson to be the owner the State Engineer approved 
an application vvhich might never have been approved 
l1ad it remained on the old land and in the name of Mc-
Garry. 
CONCLUSION 
The obvious pattern of the Utah statute is to make 
the office of the state engineer a place of rooord for 
water rights. Before the office of the state engineer was 
created there was much informality in transfers of 
water rights and in their recordation. See for exampre 
Kinney on Water Law, page 1769. Existing statutes re-
quire that the st-ate engineer be given a record of any 
transfer of a water right which is recorded in the office 
of the county recorder. All perfected rights must by ex-
press statute be recorded or th-ey ar,e void as to subse-
quent purchasers. s,ection 100-3-18 permits the transfer 
of an unperfected right; provides for its recordation, and 
also provides that when recorded it will impart construc-
tive notice to the entire world. Th-ese statutes are de-
signed to make of public record all wat-er rights .and all 
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transfers of "\Vater rights. An exactly ~parallel situation 
was presented prior to 1874 in the recordation of trans-
fers of land. The statute as it then existed did not ex-
pressly require recordation. It contained no provision 
to the effect that a failure to record would render the 
transfer void as to a subsequent purchaser. It even failed 
to provide that an instrument recorded thereunder would 
i1npart constructive notice. Our Utah Court and the 
United States Supreme Court both held that it must 
necessarily be presumed from such a statute that an in-
strument recorded thereunder would impart construc-
tive notice and further that the failure to record would 
render the transaction void as to a subsequent ·purchaser 
without actual notice. The holding by these two courts is 
in accord with usual rules of construction of statutes 
which provide for recordation. That philosophy is that 
recording statutes are remedial and were designed to 
protect bona fide purchasers and that they should be 
liberally construed to that end. There is no sense what-
ever in t~e provision of Sec. 100-3-18 making recordation 
constructive notice to the whole world unless the failure 
to record will carry with it the consequence of losing the 
right as against subsequent purchasers. Such is the exact 
basis of the opinion by the United States Supreme Court. 
After noting that the statute failed to declare a penalty 
for failure to record in favor of a bona fide ·purchaser 
the court expressly said that ''the implication is very 
strong that the latter effect must be intentional otherwise 
what value and purpose is there in construing the recor-
dation to be constructive notice of its contents, except to 
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protect such a purchaser.'' Since such a square holding 
is found from our own Supreme Court, affirmed by the 
United States Supreme Court, and in complete harmony 
both w:ith the administrative ·practice of the state en-
gineer and the spirit of recordation statutes, we think it 
not necessary to go to the cases from other states. 
PART IV 
WAS THE WATER APPURTENANT TO THE 
LAND 
It is noted from part of the brief filed by defendant 
Thompson that the question of whether or not the water 
was appurtenant to McGarry's land is of some import-
ance. In this regard we wish to note that this Supreme 
Court has held in a suit to which the state engineer was 
a party that an undrilled well could not be appurtenant 
to land. (See Duchesne County v. Humphreys, 106 Utah 
332, 148 P. 2d 338). Further, it has been unequivocally 
held that water owned by one party cannot be appurten-
ant to land owned by another. In the instant" case the 
land was owned by McGarry and the application was 
filed by Hintzen for use on McGarry's land. With such 
a diversity of ownership the water could not have been 
appurtenant to the land even had the well been drilled. 
Such was the holding of the Utah court in the case of 
Utah Metal & Tunnel Co. v. Groesbeck, 62 Utah 251, 219 
P. 248. The water was not .appurtenant to the land and 
Thom·pson should not be held to have received any con-
structive notice based upon some erroneous concept that 
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the water \Vas appurtenant to the McGarry land. If he 
lmew the la,Y, and he \vas presumed to know it, he would 
have lmo,vn that since the well had not been drilled it 
"~as not appurtenant to nfcGarry's land, and would like-
'vise have kno'vn that the transfer (giving back) of the 
land by Hintzen to )IcGarry would not carry with it any 
'vater right because the water was not appurtenant to the 
land. 
R~spectfully submitted, 
ELIAS HANSEN 
Attorr~Aey for App~ellamt, 
Jerold E. Thomp-s~on 
GROVER A. GILE·s, 
.Attoirney General 
EDWARD W. CLYDE, 
Sp·ecial Ass't. Atilorney Gener,al, 
Att.orneys for Ed. H. W~atson, 
State Engilneer of Utah. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
